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￿ Over a ten year period starting in the mid 90￿ s I became convinced that all
these topics ￿game theory, economic design, voting theory ￿belonged to a
common area which I called Social Software.￿￿ Rohit Parikh, [Parikh 05]:
p. 252
Around the turn of the millenium Rohit Parikh launched a new important pro-
gram on the borderline of computer science and epistemology. ￿ Social software￿
has aquired two meanings recently: One in which social software denotes various
web-based software programs of a ￿ social nature￿from Facebook to Wikipedia
and a meaning, now canonical, according to an entry exactly in Wikipedia, in
which social software
... studies the procedures of society whether elections, conferences etc.
as analogous to computer programs to be analyzed by similar logical and
mathematical tools.
The formal tools of the trade are described in Parikh￿ s seminal papers [Parikh 01],
[Parikh 02] and subsequenly spelled out as "(1) logic of knowledge, (2) logic of
games, and (3) game theory and economic design." [Pacuit & Parikh 07]: p.
442.
These tools are also common to a related new trade called formal epistemol-
ogy which also by a recent entry in Wikipedia is characterized as
... a subdiscipline of epistemology that utilizes formal methods from logic,
probability theory and computability theory to elucidate traditional epis-
temic problems.
Social software and formal epistemology are both interdisciplinary approaches
to the study of agency and agent interaction but are not quite to be confused
with yet a new trend in philosophy recently social epistemology [Goldman 99].
While social software and formal epistemology share the same toolbox, social
1epistemology pays stronger homage to the standard philosophical methodology
of conceptual analysis and intuition pumps.
Although sounding derogatory, conceptual analysis is not necessarily a bane
as long as it is regimented by formal structure. In social software, the for-
mal structure is provided by the aforementiond tools. While modelling agency
and interaction certain methodological distinctions may have to be explicitly ob-
served exactly in order to make conceptual sense of the use of logic of knowledge,
logic of games, game theory and economic design in social software.
No better occassion to review but a few of these methdological distinctions
and their conceptual impact in light of the 70th birthday of the founding archi-
tect of social software in the important sense￿ Rohit Parikh.
1 Perspectives, Agents and Axioms
Contemporary epistemology often draws a distinction between descriptive and
normative theories of knowledge. There is a similar distinction in moral philoso-
phy between descriptive and normative ethics. The former attempts to describe
actual moral behavior while the latter sets the standards for correct moral con-
duct.
Similarly, descriptive epistemologies account for actual epistemic practice
while normative ones are to prescribe rules of inquiry in terms of mechanisms for
avoiding error and gaining truth, truth-conducive justi￿cation criteria, learning
and winning strategies, procedures for revising beliefs etc. The distinction is
sometimes blurred by the fact that while describing actual epistemic practice
one may have to de￿ne various notions like, say, knowledge itself, justi￿cation
and reliability inviting normative aspects.
Both descriptive and normative epistemologies usually subscribe to the com-
mon premiss that epistemic practice of agents by and large is ￿ rational￿ . What
separates the two stances is whether epistemology is simply to describe this
very practice or try to optimize it. Irrational epistemic behavior would be to
follow some practice which a priori may be demonstrated to be en route to
error (when this very practice is an available course of conduct to the agent
in the environment) [Kelly 96], [Hendricks 01]. It is not necessarily irrational
on the other hand not to follow some prescription if the natural epistemic mi-
lieu sets the standards for what the agent is able to do and this prescription is
not among them. The local epistemic circumstances may for one reason or the
other bar the agent in question from choosing the best means for an end. Con-
straints could even be such that they reward ￿ irrational￿behavior. Calling such
epistemic situations irrational would undermine the common premiss which the
two approaches subscribe to. Not only may the environment limit the agent￿ s
behavior, other agents may as well. This is for instance illustrated by game
theory￿ s distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Sometimes agents would be able to have more knowledge than they actually
have if they were not tied up in their local epistemic theater. Then they could
freely pursue the optimal means for obtaining some desirable result whether
2truth, epistemic strength or winning in some other sense. One may then right-
fully ask why epistemologists sometimes are in the business of means-ends pre-
scriptions that no local agent is able to meet. There are two with each other
related answers to this question:
￿ As epistemologists we are not only in the business of ascribing ourselves
knowledge, but equally much in the business of ascribing knowledge to
other agents. Lewis has pointed out that there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence
between one agent ascribing himself knowledge in his local epistemic situ-
ation, and us ascribing him knowledge given the situation we are in. The
two situations do not always coincide. First and third persons do not
share the same real world in many contexts. There are rules to follow
under knowledge attribution to oneself and others to know what we think
we know.
￿ Rather principled information about what it would take to solve the epis-
temic task at hand, than no information at all. Epistemology is about
whether knowledge is possible and about what agents can and cannot
know insofar knowledge is possible. The problem is that it is not always
clear from within whether something is knowable or not. One recurs to
a perspective from without for a principled answer which may then spill
over into the local circumstances.
According to Lewis [Lewis 96], the agent may actually know more than we are
able to ascribe to him. On his account this is due to the fact that the attribution
of knowledge is highly sensitive to which world is considered actual and for whom
in a given context. An agent in his environment is more likely to be aware of
what the relevant possibilities are given the world considered actual by him than
the knowledge ascriber standing by him or even outside. Lewis refers to these
two stances as a ￿rst versus a third person perspective on inquiry.
Observe that an agent is free to be prescribe recommendations for himself
to follow as long as the means suggested are available to him where he is.
Outsiders may also freely prescribe recommendations for the agent inside as
long as they are available to the agent in question. If the outsider decides to
prescribe a course of conduct to solve an epistemic problem for the agent in the
environment unavailable to the agent then the situation changes. Emphasized
is then what it would take to solve the epistemic problem regardless of whether
the agent is capable of actually performing the action(s) it would take .
Normative/descriptive, ￿rst person versus third person perspectives are not
mutually exclusive distinctions. The distinction between descriptive and nor-
mative theories of knowledge together with a modi￿ed version of Lewis￿￿rst
and third person perspective dichotomy are subsumed in the following two for-
mulations:
First person perspective￿ A perspective on scienti￿c inquiry is ￿rst
person if it considers what an agent can solve, can do or defend
considering the available means for an end given the epistemic envi-
ronment he is sunk into
3Third person perspective￿ A perspective on scienti￿c inquiry is third
person if it considers what an agent could solve, could do or defend
considering the best means for an end independently of the epistemic
environment he is sunk into
In criticizing some epistemological position, whether mainstream or formal,
without noticing that the criticism is based on a third person perspective and the
position advocated is ￿rst person may again turn out to be criticizing an apple
for not being an orange [Hendricks 06]. The dichotomy has a signi￿cant bearing
on the general epistemological and conceptual plausibility given the formal tools
utilized by social software in modelling agent and agent interaction.
2 Setting up the Matrix
What is being studied from the ￿rst and the third person perspective respec-
tively using the logics of knowledge (and games) in social software are
￿ an agent or multiple agents in concert, and
￿ various epistemic axioms and systems characterizing the knowledge of one
or more agents.
The task now is to tell a plausible epistemological story about the axioms
valid while modelling, say, one agent, from a ￿rst person perspective and so
forth for the remaining possibilities in the matrix
First person Third person
One agent x x
Multiple agents x x
for x 2 fT,K,D,4,5g1
Here is an example of an epistemological story told about modelling one
agent from a ￿rst person perspective all the way to S4: Hintikka stipulated
that the axioms or principles of epistemic logic are conditions descriptive of a
special kind of general (strong) rationality for a single agent and on a ￿rst person
perspective [Hintikka 62]. The statements which may be proved false by appli-
cation of the epistemic axioms are not inconsistent meaning that their truth is
logically impossible. They are rather rationally ￿ indefensible￿ . Indefensibility
is ￿ eshed out as the agent￿ s epistemic laziness, sloppiness or perhaps cognitive
incapacity whenever to realize the implications of what he in fact knows. Defen-
sibility then means not falling victim of ￿ epistemic neglience￿as Chisholm calls
it. The notion of indefensibility gives away the status of the epistemic axioms
and logics. Some epistemic statement for which its negation is indefensible is
1Only these 5 canonical axioms are considered here, others may be discussed as well ￿see
[Hendricks 06].
4called ￿ self-sustaining￿ . The notion of self-sustenance actually corresponds to
the concept of validity. Corresponding to a self-sustaining statement is a log-
ically valid statement. But this will again be a statement which is rationally
indefensible to deny. So in conclusion, epistemic axioms are descriptions of
rationality.
There is evidence to the e⁄ect that Hintikka early on was in￿ uenced by the
autoepistemology of Malcolm [Malcolm 52] and took, at least in part, their au-
toepistemology to provide a philosophical motivation for epistemic logic. There
is an interesting twist to this motivation which is not readily read out of au-
toepistemology. Epistemic axioms may be interpreted as principles describing a
certain strong rationality. The agent does not have to be aware of this rational-
ity, let alone able to immediately compute it from the ￿rst person perspective
as Hintikka argues when it comes to axiom K:
In order to see this, suppose that a man says to you, ￿ I know that p but I
don￿ t know whether q￿and suppose that p can be shown to entail logically
q by means of some argument which he would be willing to accept. Then
you can point out to him that what he says he does not know is already
implicit in what he claims he knows. If your argument is valid, it is
irrational for our man to persist in saying that he does not know whether
q is the case. [Hintikka 62], p. 31.
The autoepistemological inspiration is vindicated while Hintikka argues for
the plausibility of 4 as a governing axiom of his logic of knowledge as he refers
to Malcolm:
This is especially interesting in view of the fact that Malcolm himself uses
his strong sense of knowing to explain in what sense it might be true that
whenever one knows, one knows that one knows. In this respect, too,
Malcolm￿ s strong sense behaves like mine. [Hintikka 70], p. 154.
Besides the requirement of closure and the validity of the 4, axiom T is also valid
to which Malcolm would object. A logic of autoepistemology is philosophically
congruent with Hintikka￿ s suggestion for a S4 epistemic logic describing strong
rationality from a ￿rst person point of view for a singular agent.
The key debate of whether epistemic axioms are plausibly describing agent-
hood or not seems much to depend on whether one subscribes to a ￿rst or a
third person perspective on inquiry. Given an autoepistemological inspiration
epistemic axioms describe a ￿rst person knowledge operator as Hintikka sug-
gested. If epistemic axioms are describing implicit knowledge as Fagin et al.
suggest [Fagin et al. 95], then what is being modelled is what follows from ac-
tual knowledge independently of agent computations. Agents can on this third
person perspective not be held actually responsible for failing to exercise some
re￿ ective disposition. Closure principles may be problematic from the point
of view of the agent, not necessarily from point of view of the ones studying
the agent third person. Logical omniscience as a consequence of the epistemic
5axioms is a problem from a ￿rst person perspective but not necessarily from a
third person perspective.
We are not going to ￿ll in all the cells of the matrix with epistemological
stories, just discuss one additional axiom which is tricky for knowledge, games
and economic design, agents and any point of view.
3 Negative Introspection of Knowledge
One of the most celebrated motivations for the plausibility of axiom 5, or the
axiom of negative introspection, is a closed-world assumption in data-base ap-
plications [Fagin et al. 95]: An agent examining his own knowledge base will be
led to conclude that whatever is not in the knowledge base he does not know
and hence he will know that he does not. This is a ￿rst person motivation, but
in the same breath, the argument for dodging logical omniscience is based on
a third-person operative as seen above. So there is some meandering back and
forth while arguing for the axiomatic plausibility of agency.
Axiom 5 may seem unrealistically strong for a singular agent in his envi-
ronment, unless his environment is de￿ned solipsistically, e.g. the closed world
assumption. Solipsism is not necessarily a human or a real agent condition but
a philosophical thesis; a thesis making idealized sense standing outside looking
at the agent in his, admittedly, rather limited epistemic environment. Being a
stone-hearted solipsist on a ￿rst person basis is hard to maintain coherently as
W.H. Thorpe once reported:
Bertrand Russell was giving a lesson on solipsism to a lay audience, and
a woman got up and said she was delighted to hear Bertrand Russell say
he was a solipsist; she was one too, and she wished there were more of us.
A reason for adopting the ￿rst person perspective and pay homage to axiom 5 for
singular agents is that these assumptions provide some nice technical advantages
/ properties especially with respect to information partition models. There is
now also a philosophical basis for doing things in this idealized way￿ epistemic
solipsism and no false beliefs, e.g. infallibilism. Both of these philosophical
theses have little to do with logic but plenty to do with the preconditions for
studying knowledge from any point of view.
4 Negative Introspection in Games
It is more sticky to argue that axiom 5 is reasonable to assume in multi-agent
setups. But when game theorists for instance model non-cooperative extensive
games of perfect information an S5 logic of knowledge is used to establish the
backward induction equilibrium [Bicchieri 03].
For game theory the untenability of S5 in multi-agent systems is quite severe.
The problem concerns the knowledge of action as Stalnaker has pointed out: It
should be possible for a player ￿ to know what a player ￿ is going to do. For
6instance it should be rendered possible in case ￿ only has one rational choice,
and ￿ knows ￿ to be rational, that ￿ can predict what ￿ is going to do. This
should not imply however that it is impossible for ￿ to act di⁄erently as he has
the capacity to act irrationally. In order to make sense of this situation what is
needed is a counterfactually possible world such that
1. ￿ acts irrationally, but
2. is incompatible with what ￿ knows.
Now ￿￿ s prior beliefs in that counterfactual world must be the same as they
are in the actual world for ￿ could not in￿ uence ￿￿ s priors beliefs by making a
contrary choice (by de￿nition of the game, ￿ and ￿ act independently). Then
it has to be the case in the counterfactual world, that ￿ believes he knows
something (e.g. that ￿ is irrational) which he in fact does not know. This is
incompatible with S5.
Additionally, acting in the presence of other agents requires the information
to be explicitly available to the agents ￿rst person, but it may only be implicitly
at the agents￿disposal if the over-all model is of implicit knowledge. It is not
much help to have the knowledge explicitly available on the third person level
if you have to make an informed move on the ￿rst person level featuring other
agents trying to beat you as you are trying to beat them.
5 Negative Introspection in Economics
This discussion of the untenability of S5 is not in any way linked to a view
of inappropriateness of modelling a third person notion of knowledge via the
axiom of veridicality T. One may reasonably argue like Stalnaker and Aumann
that knowledge requires truth referring to a notion of third-person knowledge.
The unintuitive results obtained by Aumann and others indicate that there is
something wrong in the information model used by economists, which assumes
that agents engaged in economic interactions actually have common knowledge
rather than common belief. Thus one can infer that the impossibility of trade
can be concluded from assuming that the agents engaged in economic interaction
have more powers than they actually have. Once one endows agents with a more
realistic epistemic model, it is possible to agree to disagree and trade is made
plausible again.
Collins￿explanation of what is wrong in Aumann￿ s models is quite plausible.
If agents have common belief rather than common knowledge then they cannot
share a common prior, a crucial probabilistic assumption in Aumann￿ s seminal
paper ￿ Agreeing to Disagree￿[Aumann 76]. An intuitive explanation is provided
by Collins:
Finally, an opponent might challenge my claim that it is belief rather
than knowledge that ought to be central to interactive epistemology. My
response to this is simply to point out that agents, even rational agents,
7can and do get things wrong. This is not a controversial claim, just
the commonplace observation that rational agents sometimes have false
beliefs. The reason for this is not hard to ￿nd. It is because the input
on which we update is sometimes misleading and sometimes downright
false. To demand that everything an agent fully believes be true is not to
state a requirement of rationality but rather to demand that the agent be
invariably lucky in the course of her experience. Being completely rational
is one thing; always being lucky is another. [Collins 97].
Nothing is here said about what it would actually mean to have knowledge
in economic exchanges. Perhaps to be always lucky aside from rational. This
entails that the notion of knowledge does require truth in order for it to be
intelligible. Collins points out that agents get things wrong all the time, even
while being completely rational. Aumann￿ s theorem demonstrate how alien to
our everyday endeavors the notion of knowledge is. The notion of rationality
can at most require that the agent only holds beliefs that are full beliefs, i.e.,
beliefs which the agent takes as true from his ￿rst person point of view.
Disagreement alone does not su¢ ce for altering anyone￿ s view. Each agent
will therefore have some type of acceptance rule that will indicate to him whether
it is rational or not to incorporate information. Sometimes the agent might lend
an ear to an incompatible point of view for the sake of the argument and this
might end up in implementing a change of view. When a network of agents is
modeled from the outside, endowing these agents with third-person knowledge
(as is customarily done in economic models) seems inappropriate. Be that as it
may, if the agents are rational one should assume that their theories are in au-
toepistemic equilibrium, and this leads to the assumption that the ￿rst person
views are each one S5 [Arl￿-Costa 98]. These two things are perfectly compat-
ible, which does not imply that certain type of inputs (the ones that are marked
positive by your preferred theory of acceptance) might require perturbing the
current autoepistemic equilibrium via additions or revisions. The philosophical
results questioning the use of S5 in interactive epistemology, question the fact
that economic agents can be modeled by the game theorist as having third per-
son knowledge. These results do not necessarily have a bearing for what one
might or must assume about the ￿rst-person point of view of each agent.
6 Axioms of Distinction
In a recent interview, Parikh takes stock of the contemporary situation in epis-
temology:
Currently there is sort of a divide among two communities interested in
knowledge. One is the community of epistemologists for whom the 1963
paper by Gettier has created a fruitful discussion. The other community
is the community of formal epistemologists who trace their roots back to
modal logic and to Hintikka￿ s work on knowledge and belief. There is
relatively little overlap between the two communities, but properties of
8the formal notion of knowledge, e.g., positive and negative introspection,
have caused much discussion. I would suggest that knowledge statements
are not actually propositions. Thus unlike ￿There was a break-in at Wa-
tergate,￿￿Nixon knew that there was a break-in at Watergate,￿is not a
proposition but sits inside some social software. It may thus be a mistake
to look for a fact of the matter. The real issue is if we want to hold Nixon
responsible. [Parikh 05]: 145.
Parikh is right in emphasizing that too much ink perhaps has been spilled
over formal properties of knowledge rather than on how knowledge is acquired.
Surely, much epistemic and moral success has to do with procedures and processes
for getting it right rather than static epistemic de￿nitions and axioms of chara-
terization.
The two endavours are not mutually exclusively. Axioms are used to a
procedural end in agency and agent interaction because much of the (game
theoretical) dynamics is dependent on the epistemic powers of the agents given
axiomatically. "The real issue is if we want to hold Nixon responsible", or
put di⁄erently, the real issue is whether there is a reliable (possibly e⁄ective)
procedure, or strategy, for converging to the correct epistemic result (axiom or
verdict) or winning the game against nature or other agents. Formal learning
theory or ￿ computational epistemology￿as Kelly recently redubbed the paradigm
is extensively concerned with the former, social software with the latter. By the
end of the day, the two approaches are very similar in their procedural outlook
on inquiry and success.
A successful epistemic story told is dependent on
￿ what the agent(s) can do in the environment,
￿ given the
￿the axioms describing their epistemic powers, and
￿the procedures of knowledge acquisition,
￿ pace the ￿rst person / third person point of view.
And so to ￿nish o⁄ with a question based on the matrix above:
Are there axioms of distinction exclusively separating the
￿rst-person perspective from the third-person perspective?
Such an axiomatic separation would hopefully supplement the great epistemo-
logical range and plausibility of the tools employed in Rohit Parikh￿ s seminal
and important program, social software.
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